

# A more ambitious, effective Global Partnership for Education:

## Three priorities for the next phase of reform

Briefing by civil society organisations, May 2012

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# Summary

Sixty seven million children remain out of school, almost 800 million adults cannot read and write, and many millions more are let down by the extremely poor quality of the education they receive. The Global Partnership for Education (GPE) is unique as a formal partnership of southern governments, donor agencies, civil society and other interested actors, aiming to make an impact on this scandalous situation through coordinated support to national education plans.

Reforms of the GPE since its establishment in 2002 – and particularly in the last two years – have significantly advanced its ability to tackle this challenge, particularly through more balanced and equal governance arrangements. Yet the GPE's ability to act in the manner and to the scale required is still significantly constrained by structural problems, which hold it back from delivering fully on its promise. In particular:

- The hosting of the Secretariat within the World Bank and the reliance on the World Bank at country level create problems with autonomy, accountability, conflicts of interest, displacement of funds, bureaucracy and the GPE's identity as a partnership. We are therefore calling for **a strengthened and independent Secretariat**, with an empowered and active Board, a Secretariat with expanded capacity and the mandate to engage directly with recipient countries and stronger participation by other donors as Supervising Entities at country level.
- The failure to ensure full and meaningful civil society participation undermines national ownership of education plans and accountability for their delivery, and undermines one of the GPE's key benefits as an inclusive partnership. We are therefore calling for **institutionalised civil society participation** to be a requirement, with a set of minimum standards; for ongoing support to civil society capacity; for improved transparency and for a review of GPE processes at country level.
- The GPE is not yet fit for purpose in reaching those most marginalized from education, including – but not only – children in conflict-affected and fragile states (CAFS). We are therefore calling for **flexible approaches to meet the challenges of equity, marginalisation and CAFS**, including the endorsement of plans in CAFS based on a credible commitment to improve, greater use of tools such as pooled funds and NGO consortia for delivery within the overall framework of coherent national plans and ownership, greater in-house expertise and stronger partnerships to improve capacity on marginalisation, and systematic use of the Equity and Inclusion tool.

We have a shared responsibility to ensure that the GPE is fit for purpose and acting with the ambition required to deal with the education crisis. We as civil society organisations believe that these steps (whilst not a comprehensive agenda) are crucial to that effort, and will continue to work with the GPE Board and Secretariat to ensure that these issues are addressed, that the GPE becomes a genuine and equal partnership, and that it is designed in the best way possible to meet the urgent challenge of tackling the barriers to education for all.

# Introduction

The Global Partnership for Education (GPE, formerly the EFA-Fast Track Initiative) is a partnership of southern governments, bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, teachers, civil society and the private sector, aiming to realise education for all through coordinated support. Now in its tenth year, the GPE has a unique approach to education, bringing together a range of partners to ensure coordinated support to national education plans. Through a focus on national plans and coordination, it can reinforce democratic ownership and ensure support to the strengthening of the whole education system. Yet there is still work to be done to ensure that the GPE – which has already changed considerably since being established in 2002 – is fully fit for purpose in delivering its mission in the way and to the scale required. This update assesses the progress on reform so far, outlines the outstanding areas where action is still required and offers recommendations for completing the reform process.

The last two years, since the publication of a comprehensive external evaluation in 2010, have seen considerable change. The mid-term evaluation was joined by external calls for reform, including from UNESCO's 2010 EFA Global Monitoring Report, Oxfam International, the Global Campaign for Education, and the Brookings Institution. The partnership has also recently mobilised much-needed new resources through a replenishment conference in 2011, although these resources do not come close to the additional \$13 billion a year required to

fill the EFA financing gap for the poorest countries. The Global Campaign for Education and its members in the education advocacy community actively supported replenishment, because we feel that progress made on reforms represented a sign of increased ambition for the partnership, that the GPE is one of the most effective ways currently available for donors to invest their support for basic education, and that it was important to guarantee its continued existence and growth.

Despite this continued belief in the value and importance of the GPE, it is clear that the reform process, which has so far not addressed some of the 2010 evaluation's most challenging recommendations, is far from complete. A more ambitious agenda for change is needed if the GPE is to deliver fully on its aims. With the GPE's Board of Directors having initiated a review of the hosting arrangements of the Secretariat and established a working group to develop a strategic plan for 2012-2015, the whole membership of the partnership now has a critical opportunity to demonstrate bold vision in driving its further transformation. The scale of the challenge demands that all stakeholders – southern governments, donor governments, international institutions, civil society and other partners – work together to ensure that the GPE is truly fit for purpose. The success or failure of the GPE is a success or failure for all of us.

## Steps in the right direction

The GPE's Board of Directors and leadership deserve credit for embarking on a reform process that has made notable improvements to the effectiveness of the partnership, especially at the global level. Some of the most important changes since the evaluation relate to governance, brand and scope. An independent Chair of the Board has been appointed, providing enhanced leadership and delivering increased progress on reform. The Board of Directors has been restructured to balance the voices of recipient and donor governments, and to move to a constituency-based representation. Financing decisions have been democratised and are now subject to a Board sub-committee (which includes recipient countries). A revised charter has been agreed that expands the scope of the initiative to address the full Education for All agenda, rather than just primary education. The organisation has also revamped its brand and identity to more clearly communicate its mission, shifting its name from the 'Education for All Fast Track Initiative' to the Global Partnership for Education.

Other signs of progress include the decision to move to a streamlined trust fund architecture, which combined the Catalytic Fund, Education Program Development Fund and Secretariat Fund into a single GPE Fund, allowing for more coherent resource management. Very importantly, the trust fund now has Financial Intermediary Fund status with the World Bank, which allows donor agencies other than the Bank to supervise disbursement of funds at the country level.

Finally, a results framework and an accountability matrix have been agreed (although these still require further discussion) along with a monitoring and evaluation strategy that includes plans to form a new M&E unit in the Secretariat. The Secretariat has also modestly increased its capacity, including in its country support team, which facilitates GPE country-level processes. Some progress has been made on transparency, with increased information available for countries where the World Bank is Supervising Entity, although this information can be difficult to locate online. Overall, there is a sense that the GPE is becoming a more open, inclusive and responsive organisation.

# Delivering on the mission: three critical priorities for reform

While this progress is encouraging, there remain serious constraints on the GPE's performance that impact its ability to deliver its mission. The GPE describes itself as "the only multilateral partnership devoted to getting all... children into school for a quality education". It emphasises strongly this "unique partnership model", its transformative impact on coordination, and the additional resources and support it provides. For the GPE to deliver on its mission, it must act as:

- **A driver and catalyst of dramatic change in progress towards Education for All**, which must include a focus on those most left behind by the progress made so far.
- **An ambitious and focused champion of education**, elevating the profile of and focus on education among all governments, as well as other actors.
- **A true partnership, which brings together as wide a range of partners as possible to engage on a full and equal basis**, assuring that the voices of both southern governments and civil society are clearly heard, which fosters learning among partners.
- **A champion of country-led planning and coordinated, aligned aid**, building democratic dialogue and true country ownership by ensuring the participation of national stakeholders – both governments and non-state actors.
- **A provider and catalyst of additional finance**, which – both through its own financing and through a significant impact on other donor contributions – not only meets its own fundraising targets, but also makes a significant dent in the overall EFA financing gap.

Our concern, as civil society organisations with a strong interest in seeing the GPE succeed, is that there are weaknesses in the current structure, processes and capacity of the GPE that hinder its ability to fully meet these aims. In particular, its hosting arrangements within the World Bank impact negatively on its ambition and leadership, its partnership model, its organisational agility and its effect in catalysing additional finance. Engagement of civil society and development of appropriate structures to support to the most marginalised from education, including in situations of conflict, also stand out as areas in need of urgent improvement. The GPE must clearly add value to the education sector in all its work, and not simply redirect donor funds to partner programmes. To address the most urgent issues, and to continue down the path of reforms set out by the mid-term evaluation, we believe the next phase of reform should be driven by three critical priorities, each of which will be explored below:

- A managed transition to a strong and independent GPE
- Institutionalised civil society participation
- Greater operational flexibility and innovation in order to reach those most marginalised and disadvantaged in accessing education, including those in conflict-affected states.

This is not a comprehensive agenda for change at the GPE, and we – along with other partners – will continue to advocate for further changes where we see the need. But these are the immediate priorities for structural reform, on which action is urgently needed. We call on all partners – southern governments receiving GPE funds, donor governments and agencies, and we and our allies in civil society – to work together to continue an ambitious reform process that will ensure that GPE is fit for the purpose of reaching the millions around the world who are denied a seat in the classroom and a fair chance to learn.

# 1. A managed transition to a strong and independent GPE

The GPE's lack of full autonomy places clear constraints on its performance. The World Bank plays a dominant role in the partnership, both hosting the global Secretariat and acting as Supervising Entity for GPE funds in all but five of the 40 countries that have received or are receiving funds. The Bank's role in helping create GPE and ensure that it became operational has been enormously valuable, and its support and engagement have continued with generous hosting of the Secretariat, provision of technical expertise and knowledge and presence on the Board as well as acting as default Supervising Entity (SE). However, as highlighted in the mid-term evaluation, the World Bank's multiple roles in the GPE have led to "ambiguity and potential conflicts of interest."<sup>1</sup>

## Why call for an independent Secretariat?

A number of the problems that we are most concerned about, while they may be exacerbated or complicated by the Bank's other roles in the GPE, relate specifically to the Bank's role as host of the GPE Secretariat. These are the following:

- **Lack of institutional leadership from the Bank on education.** The World Bank is not currently acting as a global leader in education<sup>2</sup>. Education made up only 4% of the Bank's \$43 billion in total investments in 2011<sup>3</sup>, and spending on basic education was just \$403 million, less than 1% of the total<sup>4</sup>. Over the last 10 years, the Bank has significantly reduced investments in primary education in sub-Saharan Africa<sup>5</sup> – which represents by far the biggest group of GPE client countries – and a recent study of 28 GPE countries found that the Bank will not renew basic education programmes in more than half after 2012<sup>6</sup>. Moreover, the Bank's regional strategy for Africa fails to reflect the importance of investments in basic education for human development, focusing narrowly on education as instrumental for workforce development and livelihoods.

Meanwhile, the GPE still lacks the profile and visible ambition that is needed to fulfil its mandate and deal with the global education crisis, as various commentators have noted<sup>7</sup>. Initiatives in the health sector that have been much more successful in raising funds and profile – such as the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM) and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) – have in the past been hosted by the World Health Organization (WHO), whose mandate is specific and whose political activity is entirely focused on health, and have subsequently chosen to become independent entities in order to meet their goals.

- **Dual lines of accountability.** The head of the Secretariat is line-managed and evaluated by the World Bank education sector director within the Human Development Network (HDN), in addition to reporting to the GPE Board and its Chair. Secretariat staff members have their salaries paid by the Bank and are contractually accountable to the Bank. This means that the GPE is in effect managed by one of its partners, which has its own distinct goals, approaches and strategy. Whilst the Bank's support has been extremely important in establishing the GPE, this is not by any means an acceptable institutional management structure over the long term. It is not in line with the ambition and aim of the GPE to act as a genuine partnership of diverse actors in the sector, and it constrains the ability of the Secretariat to hold the Bank to account for its performance as a Supervising Entity or more broadly as an active partner.

For example, when concerns were raised that the Bank's role in managing GPE funds at country level may be contributing to a migration of International Development Association (IDA) financing away from basic education in GPE countries, the Secretariat on its own, despite raising the issue, was unable to broker an adequate solution. Only after two years of external pressure from civil society organisations was the issue discussed at the GPE Board (in November 2011), and only recently has this led to substantive dialogue with senior Bank staff. This failure of the Secretariat to have an impact on Bank behaviour is due not only to its low standing within the Bank, but also to the constraints it faces in raising sensitive issues effectively with the Bank.

A proposal to incrementally upgrade the status of the GPE's Head to director level within the Bank's Human Development Network, reporting to the Vice President, may give the GPE slightly higher status within the Bank's structures, but does not fundamentally alter this fact of dual accountability. Rather, an empowered and autonomous Secretariat is required.

- **Inability to manage conflicts of interest.** A specific, and worrying, implication of this dual accountability is that the Secretariat is ill-equipped to manage conflicts of interest resulting from the Bank's strong role in GPE. The mid-term evaluation warned that "conflicts of interest have been a serious constraint on the Secretariat's ability to serve the interests of the partnership as a whole."<sup>8</sup> A current example of this relates to the new Global and Regional Activities (GRA) program of the GPE, intended to finance technical and capacity-building initiatives and programmes at regional or global level. The initial set of indicative proposals for projects to be funded by the GRA – which was based on proposals discussed with partners at an invitation-only

meeting in January 2012 – included the World Bank as the lead agency on nearly one third of the proposed programs (six out of 20), more than any other agency. (This example also raises a question about the appropriateness of the Bank seeking limited GPE funds in an area where it already has a substantial budget of its own<sup>9</sup>.) Whilst the Bank's expertise may well be needed in these areas, the conflict of interest created by the hosting arrangement becomes acutely clear when the GPE Secretariat staff – who are officially Bank staff – are expected to propose financing allocations through a rushed, non-competitive process, with the Bank as a potential recipient of funds. Several members of the Board have objected to this arrangement, and in response to this a more transparent approach has been promised. But the problem of a Bank-managed entity allocating multi-donor funds to the Bank remains just one example of the wider problem.

- **Persistent identity confusion.** Despite the GPE's welcome and necessary re-brand in late 2011, the perception that the GPE is a World Bank initiative persists, and will continue unless further steps are taken to separate its management structure from Bank structures. This confusion is particularly strong at country level; for example, a donor staff member in Cambodia reports that "FTI is seen as a World Bank thing, not an effort on the part of several bilaterals"<sup>10</sup>, and civil society in Nicaragua reports that GPE financing is described in the national media as World Bank funding<sup>11</sup>. This tendency is also strong among Bank staff at country level, with worrying consequences (see below). But it is striking that confusion also exists even among some staff at Bank headquarters, in the Secretariat and in partner agencies, as evidenced in private communications in which – for example – GPE is frequently referred to as a part of the Bank. The GPE prides itself on being a partnership and using this nature to better mobilise funds and engage partners at all levels; southern governments and civil society, as well as other donors, should have and feel as much ownership over the GPE as the Bank does. Yet this is not the case. Privately, more than one donor has expressed reservations about giving to the GPE because of the close and unclear relationship with the Bank. Some improvement may be possible through better information and communication, but communications and branding without altering the underlying power structures will not solve the problem.
- **Bureaucratic internal processes that limit agility.** The GPE Secretariat is suspended in the bureaucracy of the Bank, a huge institution that invests many billions in infrastructure and other projects and has systems and procedures designed accordingly. This results in slow and heavy bureaucracy that places huge burdens on a small Secretariat that needs to respond quickly and flexibly to specific challenges in the education sector. In relation to human resources, for example, rigid and time-consuming procedures include the requirement to fit all job specifications into one of the Bank's pre-defined job descriptions, which define roles according to certain sets of technical expertise, regardless of whether this reflects the GPE's needs in any particular recruitment. The Bank's procurement systems, designed for

international competitive bidding on major projects, create difficulties for the Secretariat contracting with external consulting firms to deliver specific or limited pieces of work, as was the case with the identity and branding work that was undertaken around the GPE re-brand. The Bank's default travel booking systems would result in purchasing flights at sometimes double or even triple the cost of the cheapest available fares, such that the GPE has had to create additional systems to circumvent these processes. The Bank's procedures are simply not appropriate for a small partnership Secretariat, and in aggregate they create significant and unnecessary delays, costs and obstacles for the GPE in carrying out its work.

## Why call for a stronger Secretariat and partnership-wide presence at country level?

Compounding the problems created by the GPE's hosting situation is the fact that the World Bank has been the supervising entity for nearly 90 per cent of the GPE funds disbursed so far. The Bank should not be criticized for taking on this role when other donors have been generally unwilling to do so. Nevertheless, the Bank's dominant position as the country-level supervising entity for a partnership with a fundamentally different strategy and approach has created severe problems, compounded by its decreased support for basic education in some regions. Moreover, lack of a clear GPE identity at country level limits its ability to deliver on its mandate.

- **Lack of additional support for basic education in GPE countries.** It is central to the GPE's mission both to provide additional resources for countries with credible education plans and to catalyse yet further resources from other donors. But there are serious concerns that the Bank's management of GPE funds at country level is undermining even the basic additionality of GPE resources for basic education. A report by RESULTS Educational Fund<sup>12</sup> found that countries that had received a Catalytic Fund grant from the GPE experienced an average decline of 40% in IDA financing for basic education between the establishment of the GPE in 2002 and 2010. A more recent report<sup>13</sup> finds that of 28 available World Bank Country Assistance Strategies (CASs) in GPE countries, 10 explicitly identify GPE funding as the future source of funding for basic education. One stark example is Mali, where over 800,000 children of primary school age are out of school<sup>14</sup>, and recent studies show extremely poor literacy rates among those in school<sup>15</sup>. Yet the Bank's CAS identifies higher education as a strategic priority, while relying on GPE to finance basic education. The result is a lack of net additional resources for basic education, despite the clear need. The Bank points to country demand as the reason for this, yet the Results study highlights that Bank staff at country level often seem to view GPE resources as a part of the Bank's IDA resource envelope, which can thus substitute for IDA investment in basic education. Cameroon's World Bank Country Assistance Strategy, produced in 2010, states: 'As the supervising entity for the Education For All - Fast

Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) Catalytic Fund, the World Bank will provide additional trust fund support during the CAS period to help finance the implementation of the government's Education Sector Strategy.<sup>7</sup> It goes on to pledge that the World Bank will instead support post-basic education through IDA funds<sup>16</sup>. This is a very specific example of a broader concern about whether the GPE is effectively "crowding in" additional donor funds for basic education.

- Frequent failure to use the most aligned aid modalities.** It is an explicit aim of the GPE to provide aligned and coordinated financing. Yet the mid-term evaluation<sup>17</sup>, as well as a report by Oxfam in 2010<sup>18</sup>, extensively document concerns about the inflexibility of the World Bank's IDA funding instruments, which are used to disburse GPE funds in most countries. The majority of GPE funds are channelled through Bank-managed projects that do not use country systems. The Bank's rigid financial management and procurement standards create steep challenges in pooling GPE funds with existing donor pooled funds in GPE countries. IDA instruments also face difficulties in providing sector budget support – a modality that, when the country context is appropriate, increases country capacity, enhances ownership and enables support for recurrent costs such as teacher salaries. Whilst the Bank's new Program for Results funding instrument may allow IDA to more easily provide sector budget support-like financing, full roll-out of this instrument is necessarily slow, future funding caps are uncertain, and the provision of limited upfront investment with further disbursement conditioned on performance does not necessarily fit with the GPE model. Finally, a recent evaluation<sup>19</sup> of the performance of the Bank's education projects reveals that quality has been falling over the past decade, with just over half of the projects rated as satisfactory in the 2008-2010 period. These findings raise questions about whether the Bank's projects are the best vehicle for investing limited GPE resources.
- Excessive reliance on Supervising Entities and Local Donor Groups.** The GPE relies on Supervising Entities not just to supervise the delivery and monitoring of funds, but also, along with the 'Coordinating Agency' (the donor that leads the education sector group), to represent GPE at country level. Donors are not always well equipped to do this. There is an inconsistent and sometimes limited level of understanding about the GPE's identity, mission, objectives and processes among World Bank and other donor staff at country level. This detracts from the added value of the GPE to the extent that the partnership's mission and approach is not always evident in country-level processes. At present, all Secretariat communication with the recipient government is through the 'Coordinating Agency'; this makes it in effect a donor-run initiative at country level, not a true partnership of recipient governments, donors, civil society and other stakeholders. This undermines the "honest broker" role that the GPE seeks to take on in Local Education Groups.

## What should "a strong and independent GPE" look like?

Given these concerns, the explicit recommendation of the mid-term evaluation still stands, that: "[the] Secretariat needs to be greatly strengthened. It needs to be operationally independent of the WB and seen as such."<sup>20</sup> But whilst the evaluation considered that "this does not exclude being "hosted" by the WB, provided its functions are adequately "firewalled" in operational terms"<sup>21</sup>, we do not believe that it is organisationally or politically feasible to guarantee the independence of the Secretariat whilst it remains the administrative responsibility of the Bank.

Rather, there should be a managed transition to a strengthened, autonomous entity, which can address the Secretariat's constraints including the ability to resolve country-level management issues. The following should be features of a reformed GPE:

- An independent international organisation.** The Global Partnership should establish itself as a legally independent and autonomous entity, following the example of the global health funds, which have impressive achievements in fundraising, financing and acting as global champions. Whilst full independence should be the aim, and the bureaucracy of very large organizations remains something to be avoided, this does not preclude a country that is willing to provide a location for the GPE also playing an interim role by offering one of its agencies to host the Secretariat. The Board should consider relocating the Secretariat to a Southern country, which could emphasise the crucial role of southern governments and civil society in the partnership, and attract more staff with experience in relevant challenges on the ground. A move to independence will be a major change for the partnership and will take careful planning and management in order to achieve a smooth transition, minimize disruptions of aid flows to GPE countries, and enable administrative functions to continue. GPE management should contract the expertise of organisations experienced in managing demergers and organisational change to help design a careful transition, which can also help look for savings that could be found in new arrangements. The administrative details of such a transition will require careful management, but they should not detract from the broader goal of creating an organisation that is fully fit for purpose.
- A formal window in which countries and institutions can offer legal status and financial and logistical support to an independent GPE.** There are understandable concerns about the costs of a transition to independence. The GPE Board, and donors in particular, will need to provide clear indications of continued financial support for the new entity. But a detailed estimate of the costs of transition requires an assessment of all the genuine possibilities for alternative arrangements, including locations and the availability of 'champion' donors to finance such arrangements. Moreover, such an open window is in line with the transparency and partnership nature of the GPE, and should be used to discover if southern governments have an interest in the GPE being located in their countries.



- **A more empowered and active Board.** A genuine and balanced partnership requires the strong engagement of all constituencies through their Board representatives. We are calling for significant behaviour change to reflect full ownership of the partnership. Entities and groups represented on the Board should ensure high-level engagement, and attend seriously to consultation with their constituencies. Some Board members may represent very complex and broad constituencies, and there should be the possibility, for example, of additional support to southern government Board members to facilitate such consultations. For the Board to fulfil its role, there must be full disclosure by the Secretariat to the Board of advice to governments, responses to education plans and other documents relevant to decision-making.
- **An independent chief executive.** The leader of the GPE must be able to lead the Secretariat in an ambitious agenda for change by drawing on their experience, making use of their high profile and being free from the constraints of unclear reporting lines or competing institutional loyalties. The chief executive should be accountable to and managed by only the GPE Board, and be able to interact with governments and agencies at the highest level, so as to drive the agenda of the partnership in a way that promotes the achievement of Education for All.
- **A Secretariat better-equipped for its mission, including a much stronger presence at country level.** The GPE Secretariat's structure and staffing must be reoriented to better match the organisational goals and needs. As a strong and independent entity, the GPE Secretariat should be empowered to communicate directly with partner governments who are receiving GPE funds. The Secretariat urgently needs expanded capacity to support country processes more effectively: this includes more systematic support to the Local Education Groups, more substantial engagement with Education Sector Plans including integration of equity targets and stronger monitoring to ensure effective civil society participation. The Secretariat must also be empowered and equipped to hold SE agencies accountable for delivering the most aligned, coordinated and reliable aid possible (such as budget support or pooled funds), for quick and efficient disbursement, for the building of country systems and for respecting country ownership. The Board could additionally consider the creation of an Independent Review Panel, similar to that of the Global Fund, with independent education experts who can review Education Sector Plans and provide support and advice.
- **Piloting of Secretariat supervision of GPE funds.** In many countries, especially those already receiving funding through general budget support and which have strong financial management systems, the use of intermediary Supervising Entities between the GPE and the recipient country is an inefficient and duplicative practice. Whilst in some countries the SE role may require a substantial field presence and fiduciary control that the Secretariat is unlikely to develop swiftly, there is an argument for the GPE disbursing directly to governments that meet a clear set of criteria, in coordination with the Local Education Group, and using best practice in country-level monitoring and auditing to safeguard resources. This should start with one or two pilot countries, and expand as appropriate.
- **More donors participating as Supervising Entities.** The World Bank may still be well placed to play the SE role in many countries, but other donor agencies can do far more to fill gaps. The World Bank lacks education-specific expertise in conflict-affected and fragile states, and the experience and leadership of other donor agencies is desperately needed in these contexts. UNICEF's current effort to re-tool its processes to allow it to play the SE role – it is supervising or has supervised GPE funds in Afghanistan, Guinea and Madagascar – is a promising step in the right direction. But it is one of only three other donors acting as SE at present. The GPE Secretariat must work to make the responsibilities more clear, and put together a best practice guide to support donors in this role; and more donors must step up to take on this responsibility.

## 2. Institutionalised civil society participation

### Why institutionalise civil society participation?

A central element of the GPE model is the nationally-owned education sector plan, drawn up in consultation with national stakeholders in the Local Education Group (LEG) or the education sector group. Creation of the plans through broad, participatory processes is arguably even more important given the new Needs and Performance Framework and accompanying indicative allocations, which risk leading recipient governments and donors to limit the ambitions of their plan to the envelope available. All actors are needed in the LEG to ensure that the

plans developed are ambitious and cover all the issues faced by communities, even though funding for the whole plan will not come through the GPE. Civil society organisations often have information and understanding of realities at community level, beyond headline data, that governments and donors lack, and which can make programmes more effective. CSO engagement in GPE processes also increases the ability of citizens to hold governments accountable for delivery on education plans and programmes, and to do effective budget-tracking – ensuring that resources are invested wisely and are delivering results. Yet all too often, decisions about GPE plans and funding are made behind closed doors, limiting or leaving out altogether

the consultation with parliaments and with civil society that is necessary to ensure genuine national ownership. Some of the aspects that specifically need to be addressed are as follows:

- **Local Education Groups are often weak or non-existent.** The Local Education Groups (LEGs) were designed to be multi-stakeholder forums where government ministry officials, donors, civil society organisations, parliaments and other stakeholders come to the table to discuss not just education sector plans, but ongoing issues such as grant requests, implementation, monitoring etc. These bodies are essential to the success of the GPE model, but the GPE has no mechanisms to ensure they function in a participatory and inclusive manner, or to support them to reach out to a broader group of education stakeholders. The mid-term evaluation expressed “concerns about the legitimacy of the LEGs and the extent of their genuine participation in the planning process” and noted that in many countries the LEGs and the Local Donor Groups function sporadically or are even non-existent<sup>22</sup>. In a number of other countries, they function only intermittently, around the time of planning processes or Joint Annual Reviews. They can often be donor-driven fora. The evaluation also called for strengthening the country-level governance of the GPE, including the Local Education Groups, as key parts of the GPE model. To date, very little progress has been made on this recommendation.
- **CSOs are often excluded from LEG and GPE processes, or included only in an ad hoc fashion.** The GPE has supported civil society efforts to address this situation, notably by funding the Civil Society Education Fund (CSEF). In 2011, 32 CSEF-supported national education coalitions reported that they were members of LEGs, up from 18 two years earlier, and coalitions in 30 countries reported participation in development, endorsement, implementation and monitoring of national education plans, up from 14 in 2009<sup>23</sup>. The GPE Secretariat reports that national civil society organisations are now members of the LEGs in 60 per cent of countries<sup>24</sup>. Whilst this progress is important, this figure remains unacceptably low, especially given the centrality of national ownership to the GPE’s model of assistance: there must be full and meaningful civil society participation in all countries. This is not only a question of civil society capacity. In many countries, Local Donor Groups consider themselves to be LEGs and exclude others. The GPE still has a vague charter with respect to the role of CSOs; it does not take on or assign responsibility to ensure engagement of civil society actors at key moments, and has no mechanisms in place to institutionalise or enforce the principle of CSO engagement. Civil society in both Haiti and Nicaragua, for example, has reported losing access to LEGs and planning discussions when individual ‘champions’ within either government or donor agencies have moved on. Weak engagement from the Secretariat at country level means country-level stakeholders are often not well-informed about principles for CSO participation, which are poorly articulated anyway. These factors reinforce civil society’s own barriers to meaningful engagement.

- **Consultation is often a box-checking exercise.** When consultation does happen it is often at the last minute, and in some cases only with groups viewed by the government to be sympathetic. Some civil society organisations in Uganda, for example, have reported very last-minute and rushed consultation of national networks on education plans. Civil society representatives in another country have reported that the only ‘civil society’ representatives currently included in substantive education planning discussions are the representatives of the private sector education providers who dominate the education sector. It is also not clear that GPE staff systematically reach out to civil society when they undertake missions to partner countries, although increased capacity in the Country Support Team appears to be leading to improved monitoring of country-level processes and CSO participation.
- **Insufficient support to civil society in middle-income countries, many of which have large numbers of out of school children.** As donor funds diminish and government resources grow, the importance of the role of civil society in holding governments to account will also increase. It is therefore important to do more to support civil society efforts to claim their space in the development process and reinforce accountable use of funds in the education sector.

## What should institutionalised civil society participation look like?

Improving civil society participation in GPE processes, particularly through LEGs, requires a focus on both demand and supply factors. That is to say, there is a need to address both the space for civil society engagement, as well as the information, support and capacity-building available to help organisations and networks use that space effectively. GCE, its regional member networks and a number of INGO members are working to address the latter, and have had GPE support for this work, but there is also a need for GPE to reform its processes in ways that impact both aspects:

- **GPE grant flows conditioned on participation of national civil society.** Civil society is a crucial partner but lacks the power to enforce its participation. The GPE should do so. This participation should include involvement in all GPE processes, not just the development of education sector plans but also ongoing dialogue around grant applications, plan revisions, progress reports, joint assessments etc. The GPE Secretariat staff should verify this participation before funds are released, and be able to demonstrate that efforts were made to identify and engage legitimate and credible civil society groups through both country-level contacts and GPE Board constituencies. Participation does not mean that any group or set of groups has the power to ‘sign off’ or hold up finalisation of a plan or grant, but rather that civil society has been included in the dialogue around these processes, and that their input has been taken onboard when relevant – with explanations when it is not taken on board. While this provision cannot promise meaningful participation, it acts as an important safeguard by putting in place a ‘floor’ below which no GPE processes should operate.

- **Minimum standards for CSO engagement.** The GPE should agree with partners a working definition of civil society participation and lay out expectations for this. GPE Secretariat staff should be tasked with ensuring country-level partners understand these standards and are implementing them. These standards, which should draw on lessons (both positive and negative) from the experience with CSO consultations around Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), should include the following elements: inclusivity; early engagement; adequate notice; ongoing dialogue; wide scope; facilitation by a clear contact point; responsiveness (see box). If these standards are not met without good reason, the Board and the Financial Advisory Committee (FAC) should not approve financing.
- **Transparent, timely information-sharing.** This is important at both the global and country level. The GPE global website should follow the lead of innovators in the field such as the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria. It should be regularly updated with detailed information by country on grants, including grant applications, composition of programmes being funded, progress reports, evaluations etc. The new FAC is a helpful step, but the Secretariat should not rely on the civil society representative on the FAC to share all information; it must also be active itself, particularly at country level, where transparency is closely entwined with other aspects of CSO participation. The GPE should put in place guidelines for government ministries and donors to regularly share documents and reports with civil society stakeholders, including at the draft stage when feedback can still be incorporated. (See best practices in box.)
- **Long term engagement in building CSO capacity.** The GPE has provided significant financial support to country-level civil society through the CSEF. It should continue to work with civil society networks and organisations to support the strengthening of capacity, especially for more effective engagement in GPE country-level processes and monitoring of delivery on GPE grants, and in particular look for ways to build civil society support into its structures. It should support relevant learning processes for civil society as part of ensuring broader and more authentic participation in country-level processes.
- **Review of GPE governance structures at country level.** The mid-term evaluation called for a review and improvement of country-level governance structures, including the LEGs and Local Donor Groups. The GPE could commission a study to examine possibilities for improved country-level governance structures, drawing on successful models in other initiatives, and considering the issues raised in the evaluation. Such a study would need to work closely with national CSOs as well as other stakeholders to gather their ideas about the best way to structure an improved country-level governance arrangement.
- **Support education in Middle Income Countries through civil society and capacity-building.** Support could focus on strengthening civil society to hold governments accountable to deliver on the right to education, and for capacity building in regional/local governments where the greatest numbers of children are out of school.

## PROPOSED PRINCIPLES FOR CSO ENGAGEMENT

- **Inclusive:** Not just the groups the government or donors prefer to work with, but a broad cross-section of civil society. This may include national, regional and local advocacy groups or networks, teachers' unions, parent and student groups, women's organisations, indigenous groups and groups representing other marginalized populations. Emphasis should be placed on groups with membership including affected groups, particularly learners and teachers. The breadth of groups and capacity to engage often varies by country.
- **Early stage:** Rather than approaching civil society with finalised documents, which often becomes a rushed box-ticking exercise, CSOs should be involved early in the process to help shape the direction of strategies and plans.
- **Adequate notice:** CSOs should be given a reasonable turnaround time to provide comments on documents (for example two weeks), and should be informed about key meetings well in advance.
- **Ongoing:** Genuine democratic dialogue is a process, not a one-off event. Engagement should continue beyond the development of the education sector plan through to dialogue on grant applications and agreements, joint sector reviews, monitoring/progress reports etc. The process itself should build the capacity of civil society to engage in such dialogue.
- **Broad in scope:** Dialogue should include the range of relevant issues, not just 'safe' or politically easy areas.
- **Facilitated:** Ideally engagement should be facilitated by a contact person in the Local Education Group (for example, in a government ministry or donor agency) whose job it is to ensure engagement.
- **Responsive:** government representatives on the LEG should document responses to civil society input, indicating when they have been taken on board, and explaining when they have not.

# 3. Flexibility and innovation to reach the most marginalised

## Why is greater operational flexibility and innovation needed to reach those most marginalised from education?

The mission of the GPE is to ensure a quality education for all, including the 67 million children who are currently out of school. Achieving this mission requires a focus on the most marginalised and vulnerable. Over 40 percent of the children out of school – 28 million children in total – are living in countries affected by conflict<sup>25</sup> and over one third are living with a disability<sup>26</sup>. The ILO estimates that 215 million children are engaged in labour. Millions are excluded from the right to education by virtue of their race, gender, socio-economic class, cultural or linguistic identity, and geographic location, or some combination of these. If the Global Partnership is to succeed in its mission of reaching all these – the hardest to reach, those who are still excluded even after a decade of massive increases in enrolment – and also in ensuring the quality of education, then it needs to do much better at providing support and financing that is tailored to the needs of those who are excluded and disadvantaged, including those living in conflict-affected and fragile states (CAFS). Some of the current limitations include:

- **CAFS: GPE not supporting to the required scale.** The education needs of CAFS<sup>27</sup> are huge, and it should be central to the GPE's mission to focus on these neglected zones. Yet the scale of support from the GPE has been fairly modest: according to the latest data just over one third of GPE disbursements so far – a total of \$770 million over nearly 10 years – has gone to CAFS. More strikingly, the allocation per out-of-school child in CAFS has been half of the level in non-CAFS<sup>28</sup>. Both 'indicative allocations' (the amount for which countries can apply) and actual allocations are problematic. The indicative allocations are based on a 'Needs and Performance Framework', which – whilst it recognises fragility – is heavily weighted to 'country performance'. In CAFS, the needs are particularly high, but 'performance', as defined by the World Bank assessments on which the country performance rating is based, tends to be low. And there is a problem with CAFS getting actual allocations. According to the latest figures, of those CAFs that are eligible for GPE funds<sup>29</sup>, fewer than half have had funds allocated, compared to 70 per cent of eligible non-CAFS. Clearly, the fragility and weak capacity of governments in these countries poses severe problems for an initiative that aims to endorse national plans. But given the GPE's stated aim to focus on education in CAFS, and its mission to target the most marginalised children, it must find ways of working that will enable it to scale up significantly the allocation of financing for education in CAFS.
- **CAFS: disbursement is often weak.** Another feature of CAFS is that their needs are often particularly urgent, given that government revenues to maintain the education system are often lacking. Yet the GPE's rate of disbursement against allocations so far has been worse for CAFS than other countries: 57% as opposed to 69%. Conflict-affected or fragile states have some of the worst disbursement rates: Nepal, for example, had received only 25 per cent of its 2009 allocation of \$120 million by the end March 2012, Liberia had received just 17 per cent of its 2010 allocation by the same date, and Guinea, although it has received its entire Unicef-supervised allocation, has still not had disbursement of any of its World Bank-supervised allocation of \$40 million<sup>30</sup>. As above with allocations, the GPE must find ways to disburse to these countries despite weak capacity.
- **CAFS and marginalisation: GPE still has gaps in expertise and capacity for tailored support.** The country support team now includes four staff members with expertise in CAFS with another fragile states specialist joining later in 2012. But given the constraints of working in CAFS, much greater capacity is needed to ensure a tailored approach that can effectively scale up support to the required level. Moreover, expertise is needed in other causes of marginalisation, such as disability and child labour.
- **Equity and marginalisation: still insufficient focus and tools.** The GPE cannot achieve its mission without reaching the most marginalised, including many of those in CAFS but also those who are most excluded and disadvantaged within more stable countries. One particular problem is the lack of within-country data on aspects of exclusion. Before the re-launch of the Partnership as GPE, an 'equity and inclusion tool' was developed, designed to support Local Education Groups to carry out a thorough assessment of marginalisation issues in the country and to incorporate measures to address these issues in the National Education Plan. However, since the re-launch the tool is not being systematically used in GPE country-level processes and there is confusion as to whether it remains GPE policy to support its use. Moreover, whilst the GPE's focus on the quality of learning is both welcome and needed, it is important to avoid the danger of inadvertently increasing inequity by focusing on improved education for those children who are easiest to reach.

## What changes could help ensure greater focus on CAFS, equity and marginalisation?

This is a major concern for many GCE members, who will continue to recommend and demand changes to meet this need. The recommendations below are not comprehensive, but set out important changes that could be implemented immediately to make a difference.

- **Endorsement of plans linked to a credible commitment to improve in contexts of weak capacity.** The GPE needs to be able to work better in high-need, low-capacity contexts without diluting the model of support on the basis of a credible government plan. There should be a willingness to endorse plans which contain appropriate measures for immediate action, even if there will be need for ongoing revision, in order to begin offering tailored support even while working with the government and other partners to develop and improve the plan.
- **Flexible delivery of funds where government capacity is weak, including through pooled funds and NGO consortia.** GPE funds should always be focused on helping build and support comprehensive and coherent nationally-owned plans, even where government capacity for planning and implementation is weak. But this may involve different tools to operate in areas that are not well-served by existing structures, including funding to NGOs, not as supervising entities, but as actors assisting in delivery of educational services when the state is unwilling or unable to do so. This should preferably be in a consortium with government participation in the governing body. There can also be greater use of pooled funds, which the government should co-chair. These should operate under a unified plan, strictly avoiding fragmentation into micro-projects, and ensure support to strengthen government capacity with the aim of handing over full management to the government in the medium term where possible.
- **Expanded Secretariat expertise, and stronger partnerships with experts, on marginalised groups including CAFS.** There needs to be greatly expanded capacity to provide close and consistent support to the development and implementation of education sector plans in CAFS, as well as expert focus on other aspects of marginalization. Particularly important will be strong country presence throughout the process of developing and appraising national education plans. GPE should also ensure strong engagement in Education Clusters in emergency situations, and work closely with other experts such as the Global Task Force on child labour, and experts in disability and education.
- **Ensure greater attention to equity and marginalisation.** Whilst GPE grants are in support of basic education broadly, on the basis of overall sector plans, GPE's advice and technical support should include a focus on the bottom quintile and other specifically marginalised groups. This is crucial to realising EFA and not leaving certain groups behind. For example, the GPE should ensure that its new focus on quality, and specifically on early-grade reading, is conducted with equity in mind, and explicitly aims to improve early learning for first-generation learners.
- **Reinstate and ensure systematic use of the Equity and Inclusion tool.** The tool was piloted in three countries and the response was broadly positive, with some revisions being made to the guide based on the experience. The strongest aspect of the tool was that it provided a way to ensure that the approach to marginalisation was thoroughly owned at country level and appropriate to country situations, while also addressing the needs of specific populations such as girls, children with disabilities and linguistic minorities. We recommend that the Equity and Inclusion tool be reinstated and that the Secretariat be tasked to develop a strategy to ensure its systematic use in GPE country-level processes.

# Conclusion:

## Bold action needed now

The scale of the global crisis in education remains a scandal. The GPE is extremely important in mobilising and providing support to tackle this crisis, and remains one of most effective ways to provide financing for education. Its efforts to give all partners a genuine say, both at the level of global governance and in country processes; its emphasis on coordinating support around national plans, reinforcing democratic principles of ownership; its support not just to delivery of education projects but to strengthening education systems and policy-making in partner countries – all of these provide a strong case for continued support to the GPE.

Yet there remain structural weaknesses which undermine the GPE's ability to fulfil its mission, and in particular its ability to act with the level of ambition and effectiveness that the scale of the crisis requires. We therefore argue for the following changes.

### A strong and independent Secretariat

The hosting of the Secretariat by the World Bank and the excessive reliance on the Bank in countries receiving GPE funds both create problems around accountability, conflict of interest, identity confusion, bureaucracy, displacement of funds, lack of alignment, and excessive weight to the donor elements of the partnership. We therefore recommend:

- The GPE should become independent of the World Bank, with an independent chief executive reporting only to the Board, and consider establishing itself in a different location, after openly soliciting offers for legal hosting and financial support.
- The Secretariat should expand its expertise to better deliver on its mission, including with a stronger presence at country level, direct engagement with recipient governments, and capacity to provide funds directly in some contexts.
- The Secretariat and other donor partners work harder to ensure that more agencies take on the role of Supervising Entity at country level.

### Institutionalised civil society participation

The GPE has made Local Education Groups central to its model, as the forum in which discussion of national education plans should take place, and the means to assure broad engagement with and ownership of these plans. Yet the functioning and membership of these groups is hugely varied, with civil society often excluded or donors running groups alone. Much of the civil society consultation that takes place is rushed, limited or tokenistic. We therefore recommend:

- Civil society engagement should be a pre-requisite of GPE funding, with minimum standards of engagement – covering inclusion, early, ongoing and broad engagement, adequate notice, facilitation and responsiveness – to be assured by GPE staff.
- The GPE should build on previous support to civil society with long-term engagement, and consider how to build such support into its financing structures; attention should also be paid to supporting civil society in middle-income countries.
- Information should be shared in a more timely and transparent fashion.
- There should be a review of GPE structures at country level.

### Flexible approaches to reach those most marginalised from education

Those most marginalised from education include, in particular, children in conflict-affected and fragile states (CAFS), people with disabilities, child labourers, mobile pastoralist populations and those experiencing discrimination on the grounds of gender, socio-economic class, ethnic, religious or linguistic identity and other minority groups. The education needs of these groups are huge and varied – yet GPE support is not effectively meeting their needs: allocation and disbursement to CAFS is fairly weak, relevant expertise is limited, and the Equity and Inclusion tool has apparently been dropped from use. We therefore recommend:

- The GPE should be willing to fund urgent needs in CAFS based on a credible commitment to improve their education plans, and should work flexibly with mechanisms such as pooled funds and delivery through NGO consortia. This can help ensure financing for education where it is most needed, while ensuring the focus of support remains on coordinated national plans.
- Expanded Secretariat expertise on issues of marginalisation, both in-house and through effective partnerships.
- An increased focus and capacity on marginalisation and the bottom quintile, including through systematic use of the Equity and Inclusion tool.

Of course, this does not exhaust civil society's requirements of the GPE. GCE members and others have continuing concerns such as how the GPE works on issues such as disability, whether it is truly embracing the full EFA agenda, the impact of GPE advice on cost estimates for teachers and the scale of ambition in financing. Many concerns relate to some of the GPE's new tools – the Results Framework, the Accountability Framework and the Needs and Performance Framework – and how these will be further defined, used and operationalised, as well as to how the GPE proposes to continue its own fundraising and also have much more impact as a catalyst of additional bilateral financing for education.

Yet the concerns highlighted above are those we have identified as most urgent, with an emphasis on structural changes, to ensure that the GPE is fit for purpose in tackling the education crisis on a scale that will make a true impact on the achievement of education for all. As partners of the GPE, we intend to work with the Board and the Secretariat to make sure that these essential issues are addressed effectively in the coming months, to maintain the momentum of reform and ensure that the GPE becomes a genuine and equal partnership. We sincerely hope that our confidence in the GPE's collective capacity to deliver on these fundamental reforms is not misplaced.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Cambridge Education *et al.* (February 2010) 'Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative.' *Executive Summary*, p. 11

<sup>2</sup> Center for Universal Education, Brookings Institution. (September 2011) 'An Evaluation of the Global Architecture for Education – Rethinking the Fast Track Initiative.'

<sup>3</sup> <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTANNREP2011/Resources/8070616-1315496634380/04WorldBankLendingbyThemeandSector.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> RESULTS Educational Fund. (February 2012). 'The World Bank and the Education MDGs: Keeping our promises to Africa's poorest children.'

<sup>5</sup> RESULTS Educational Fund. (2010). 'World Bank Financing for Education: Less or More for the Poor in IDA 16?.'

<sup>6</sup> RESULTS Educational Fund. (2012) *op. cit.*

<sup>7</sup> See e.g. Global Campaign for Education (2011) 'Fund the Future, education rights now: a ten point plan for transforming aid to education;' Brown G. (2012) 'Delivering on the promise, building opportunity: the case for a Global Fund for Education.'

<sup>8</sup> Cambridge Education *et al.* (February 2010) 'Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative.' *Final Synthesis Report, Volume 1 – Main Report.* p. 20

<sup>9</sup> The Bank's annual investment to develop "Core Knowledge Products" reached a staggering \$605 million across sectors in 2010 alone, and in 2011 over one-third of the Bank's administrative budget was spent on producing technical, economic and sector knowledge (up from 24 percent in 2002). [http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/12/19/000333038\\_20111219020854/Rendered/PDF/651950Revised0box361556B00PUBLIC005.pdf](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/12/19/000333038_20111219020854/Rendered/PDF/651950Revised0box361556B00PUBLIC005.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> Cambridge Education *et al.* (21 August 2009), 'Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative' Country Case Study: Cambodia (draft).

<sup>11</sup> GCE survey, ongoing and forthcoming

<sup>12</sup> RESULTS Educational Fund. (2010). *Op. cit.*

<sup>13</sup> RESULTS Educational Fund. (2012). *Op. cit.*

<sup>14</sup> UIS data tables

<sup>15</sup> See e.g. Gove and Wetterburg (2011) 'The Early Grade Reading Assessment: applications and interventions to improve basic literacy,' Research Triangle International

<sup>16</sup> RESULTS Educational Fund (2012) *op. cit.*

<sup>17</sup> Cambridge Education *et al.* (February 2010) *op. cit.* (*Final Synthesis Report, Volume 1 – Main Report.*) p. 74-76

<sup>18</sup> Malouf, Katie. (January 2010) 'Resourcing Global Education: How reform of the Fast Track Initiative should lead to a Global Fund for Education.' Oxfam International. p. 16-19

<sup>19</sup> Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank. (2011) 'IEG Annual Report 2011: Results and Performance of the World Bank Group;' 'World Bank Support to Education Since 2001: A Portfolio Note.'

<sup>20</sup> Cambridge Education *et al.* (February 2010) *op. cit.* (*Executive Summary*) p. 13

<sup>21</sup> Cambridge Education *et al.* (February 2010) *op. cit.* (*Executive Summary*) p. 13

<sup>22</sup> Cambridge Education *et al.* (February 2010) *op. cit.* (*Final Synthesis Report, Volume 1 – Main Report.*) p. 19

<sup>23</sup> Highlights of the 4th CSEF Progress Report, 2011, <http://www.globalpartnership.org/support-we-offer/financing/epdf/Civil-Society-Education-Fund/>

<sup>24</sup> Global Partnership for Education Secretariat. (2011) '2011 Monitoring Exercise on Aid Effectiveness in the Education Sector.' (based on July 2011 data).

<sup>25</sup> UNESCO (2011) Education for All Global Monitoring Report. 'The hidden crisis: Armed conflict and education.'

<sup>26</sup> UNESCO (2010) Education for All Global Monitoring Report. 'Reaching the Marginalized.'

<sup>27</sup> As defined by the UNESCO GMR 2011, *op. cit.*

<sup>28</sup> Calculations based on GPE Secretariat (2012) 'EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund: Quarterly Financial Update for the Quarter Ending 31 March 2012.' CAFS countries are defined according to the list in the UNESCO GMR 2011.

<sup>29</sup> As defined by being listed on GPE website as having an indicative allocation OR an endorsed education sector plan.

<sup>30</sup> Figures relate to period up to the end of March 2012. GPE Secretariat (2012) 'EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund: Quarterly Financial Update for the Quarter Ending 31 March 2012.'

